We consider a two-dimensional optimal dividend problem in the context of two insurance companies with compound Poisson surplus processes, who collaborate by paying each other's deficit when possible. We solve the stochastic control problem of maximizing the weighted sum of expected discounted dividend payments (among all admissible dividend strategies) until ruin of both companies, by extending results of univariate optimal control theory. In the case that the dividends paid by the two companies are equally weighted, the value function of this problem compares favorably with the one of merging the two companies completely. We identify this optimal value function as the smallest viscosity supersolution of the respective Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and provide an iterative approach to approximate it numerically. Curve strategies are identified as the natural analogue of barrier strategies in this two-dimensional context. A numerical example is given for which such a curve strategy is indeed optimal among all admissible dividend strategies, and for which this collaboration mechanism also outperforms the suitably weighted optimal dividend strategies of the two stand-alone companies.
Introduction
Ever since de Finetti [14] proposed in 1957 to measure the value of an insurance portfolio by the expected discounted sum of dividends paid during the lifetime of the portfolio, it has been of particular interest to determine the optimal dividend payment strategy which maximizes this quantity. More than that, this field of research over the years turned out to be a challenging and fascinating area, combining tools from analysis, probability and stochastic control. In 1969, Gerber [15] showed that if the free surplus of an insurance portfolio is modelled by a compound Poisson risk model, it is optimal to pay dividends according to a so-called band strategy, which collapses to a barrier strategy for exponentially distributed claim amounts. Whereas Gerber found this result by taking a limit of an associated discrete problem, this optimal dividend problem was studied with techniques of modern stochastic control theory in Azcue and Muler [7] , see e.g. Schmidli [21] for a detailed overview. Since then the optimal dividend problem was studied for many different model setups, objective functions and side constraints (we refer to Albrecher and Thonhauser [2] and Avanzi [4] for surveys on the subject). A barrier strategy with barrier b pays out dividends whenever the surplus level of the portfolio is above b, so that the surplus level stays at b, and pays no dividends below that barrier b. The most general criteria currently available for barrier strategies to be optimal can be found in Loeffen and Renaud [19] . The optimality of barrier strategies when including the time value of ruin was studied in [23] , and when including capital injections by shareholders in Kulenko and Schmidli [18] .
All these control problems have been formulated and studied in the one-dimensional framework. However, in recent years there has been an increased interest in risk theory in considering the dynamics of several connected insurance portfolios simultaneously, see e.g. Asmussen and Albrecher [3, Ch.XIII.9] for an overview. Ruin probability expressions for a two-dimensional risk process are studied in Avram et al. [5, 6] for simultaneous claim arrivals and proportional claim sizes and recently in Badila et al. [11] and Ivanovs and Boxma [17] in a more general framework. In Azcue and Muler [8] , the problem of optimally transferring capital between two portfolios in the presence of transaction costs was considered, see also Badescu et al. [10] . Czarna and Palmowski [13] study the dividend problem and impulse control for two insurance companies who share claim payments and premiums in some specified proportion for a particular dividend strategy. It turns out that these multi-dimensional problems, albeit practically highly relevant, quickly become very intricate and explicit solutions can typically not be obtained without very strong assumptions.
In this paper, we would like to extend the optimal dividend problem from univariate risk theory to a two-dimensional setup of two collaborating companies. The collaboration consists of paying the deficit ('bailing out') of the partner company if its surplus is negative and if this financial help can be afforded with the current own surplus level. We solve the problem of maximizing the weighted sum of expected discounted dividend payments until ruin of both companies. A natural question in this context is whether such a collaboration procedure can be advantageous over merging the two companies completely; we will show that this is the case when the dividends paid by the two companies are equally weighted. For criteria of a merger being an advantage over keeping two stand-alone companies under pre-defined barrier strategies and marginal diffusion processes, see e.g. Gerber and Shiu [16] , for the performance of another pre-defined risk and profit sharing arrangement, see e.g. Albrecher and Lautscham [1] . Our goal here is, however, to address the general problem of identifying the optimal dividend strategy (among all admissible dividend strategies) for each company under this collaboration framework. This leads to a fully two-dimensional stochastic control problem, and to the question what the natural analogues of the optimal univariate barrier strategies are in two dimensions. The particular structure of the collaboration implemented in this paper will turn out not to be essential, so the techniques may be applicable to other risk-sharing mechanisms as well. Yet, the concrete specification allows to carry through the necessary analysis of the stochastic control problem explicitly by way of example.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and the stochastic control problem in detail and derive some simple properties of the corresponding value function V . In Section 3 we prove that V is a viscosity solution of the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for independent surplus processes, and in Section 4 we show that V is in fact its smallest viscosity supersolution. Section 5 provides an iterative approach to approximate the value function V , together with the analogous verification steps at each iteration step. Section 6 discusses the stationary dividend strategies that appear in our model, and in Section 7 we establish curve strategies as the appropriate analogues of the univariate barrier strategies. Finally, Section 8 shows how to constructively search for optimal curve strategies and in Section 9 an explicit numerical example for the symmetric (and equally weighted) case with exponentially distributed claim sizes is worked out for which such a curve strategy is indeed optimal among all admissible bivariate dividend strategies. It is then also illustrated that for this case the proposed type of collaboration is preferable to adding the best-possible stand-alone profits.
Model
We consider two insurance companies, Company One and Company Two, which have an agreement to collaborate. Let us call Xt the free surplus of Company One and Yt the one of Company Two. We assume that the free surplus of each of the companies follows a Cramér-Lundberg process, i.e. a compound Poisson process with drift given by
i , where x and y are the respective initial surplus levels; p1 and p2 are the respective premium rates; U 
are all independent of each other, and pj > λjE(U
There is a rule of collaboration signed by the two companies: if the current surplus of Company One becomes negative, Company Two should cover the exact deficit of Company One as long as it does not ruin itself, and vice versa. Ruin of a company hence occurs when its surplus becomes negative and the other company cannot cover this deficit.
A simulated surplus trajectory under this collaboration rule is shown in Figure 1 .1. Both companies use part of their surplus to pay dividends to their shareholders. The dividend payment strategy
is the total amount of dividends paid by the two companies up to time t. Let us call τ k i the arrival time of the i-th claim of company k, with k = 1, 2. We define the associated controlled process X 
corresponds to the cumulative amount transferred from Company Two to Company One up to time t in order to cover the deficit of Company One and
corresponds to the cumulative amount transferred from Company One to Company Two up to time t in order to cover the deficit of Company Two. Let us call τ the time at which only one company remains (because it cannot cover the deficit of the other), more precisely,
is defined for t ≤ τ . We say that the dividend payment strategy
is admissible if it is non-decreasing, càglàd (left continuous with right limits), predictable with respect to the filtration generated by the bivariate process (Xt, Yt), and satisfies
t . This last condition means that the companies are not allowed to pay more dividends than their current surplus. Let us call R 2 + the first quadrant. We denote by Πx,y the set of admissible dividend strategies with initial surplus levels (x, y) ∈ R 2 + . Our objective is to maximize the weighted average of the expected discounted dividends paid by the two companies until ruin of both companies. Note that after time τ , the surviving company can continue to pay dividends up to its own ruin. Let us define V 0 k (k = 1, 2) as the optimal value function of the onedimensional problem of maximizing the expected discounted dividends until ruin of Company k alone. So, for any initial surplus levels (x, y) ∈ R 2 + , we can write down the optimal value function as
Here, δ > 0 is a constant discount factor, and a1 ∈ [0, 1] and a2 = 1 − a1 are the weights of the dividends paid by Company One and Company Two respectively. The functions V 0 k (k = 1, 2) are zero in (−∞, 0) so depending on which company goes to ruin at τ , either V 0 1 (Xτ ) = 0 or V 0 2 (Y τ ) = 0. The optimal dividend strategy corresponding to (4) may be regarded as the best dividend payment strategy from the point of view of a shareholder who owns a proportion ma1 of the total shares of Company One and a proportion ma2 of the total shares of Company Two for some 0 < m ≤ min {1/a1, 1/a2}. An important particular case is a1 = a2 = 1/2, in which the dividends paid by the two companies are equally weighted (for an earlier example of weighting separate terms in the objective function in the univariate dividend context, see Radner and Shepp [20] ).
Remark 1
In case the two companies are owned by the same shareholders, another possibility of collaboration between the two companies is merging, in which case the companies put together all their surplus, pay the claims of both companies and pay dividends up to time τ at which the joined surplus becomes negative (see e.g. Gerber and Shiu [16] )). Given the initial surplus levels (x, y), we can interpret any admissible dividend payment strategy (Lt) t≥0 for the merger as an admissible collaborating one as follows
Since Lt is constant for t ≥ τ = τ , the surviving company does not pay any dividends here.
The last expected value is the value function of the merger dividend strategy (Lt) t≥0 . We conclude that the optimal collaborating strategy for equally weighted dividend payments is better than the optimal merger strategy.
Both optimal value functions V 0 1 and V 0 2 corresponding to the stand-alone companies have an ultimately linear growth with slope one and they are Lipschitz, see for instance Azcue and Muler [7] . Let us state some basic results about regularity and growth at infinity of the optimal value function V defined in (4) . From now on, let us call λ := λ1 + λ2 and p := a1p1 + a2p2.
Lemma 2
The optimal value function is well defined and satisfies
Let us first prove the second inequality. Note that V (x, y) increases when the Poisson intensities λ1 and λ2 decrease, but the optimal value function for the problem with parameters λ1 = λ2 = 0 is a1x + a2y + ∞ 0 e −δs pds = a1x + a2y + p δ , which corresponds to the value function of the strategy in which each company pays immediately the initial surplus and then it pays the incoming premium forever as dividends. In order to obtain the first inequality, consider the admissible strategy L0 = L 
−δs pds
Lemma 3
The optimal value function V is increasing, locally Lipschitz and satisfies for any
for any h > 0.
Proof.
Let us prove the inequalities at the top, the ones at the bottom are similar. Given any ε > 0, take an admissible strategy L ∈ Πx,y such that V L (x, y) ≥ V (x, y) − ε. We define the strategy L 1 ∈ Π x+h,y for h > 0 as follows: Pay immediately an amount h of the surplus of Company One as dividends and then follow the strategy L. We have that
and so
Consider also an admissible strategy L 2 ∈ Π x+h,y such that V (x + h, y) ≥ V L 2 (x + h, y) − ε and define the admissible strategy L 3 ∈ Πx,y which, starting with surplus (x, y) pays no dividends
at timeτ pays either X − y from the surplus of Company Two, depending on which of these differences is positive, and then follows strategy L 2 ∈ Π x+h,y . In the event of no claims,τ = t0 := h/p1; since the probability of no claims until t0 is e −λt 0 , we get
From (6) and (7), we get the inequalities at the top.
3 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
In order to obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation associated to the optimization problem (4), we need to state the so called Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP). The proof that this holds is similar to the one given in Lemma 1.2 of Azcue and Muler [9] and uses that V is increasing and continuous in R (Ex,y(a1
The HJB equation of this optimization problem is
Since the optimal value function V is locally Lipschitz but possibly not differentiable at certain points, we cannot say that V is a solution of the HJB equation, we prove instead that V is a viscosity solution of the corresponding HJB equation. Let us define this notion (see Crandell and Lions [12] and Soner [22] for further details).
Definition 5 A locally Lipschitz function u : R 2 + → R is a viscosity supersolution of (8) at
A function u : R 2 + → R which is both a supersolution and subsolution at (x, y) ∈ R 2 + is called a viscosity solution of (8) 
Proposition 6 V is a viscosity supersolution of the HJB equation (8) at any (x, y) with x > 0 and y > 0.
Proof. Given initial surplus levels x > 0, y > 0 and any l1 ≥ 0, l2 ≥ 0, let us consider the admissible strategy L where Company One and Two pay dividends with constant rates l1 and l2 respectively and τ is defined as in (3) . Let ϕ be a test function for the supersolution of (8) at (x, y) with x > 0 and y > 0. As before, denote τ We have for t < τ1,
t is a Poisson process with intensity λ, because the arrival times of the two companies are independent. We have from Lemma 4 that
≥ Ex,y(a1
+Ex,y(I {τ 1 =τ 1 ∧t<τ and
).
So we obtain 0 ≥ lim t→0 + Ex,y
Taking l1 = l2 = 0, l1 → ∞ with l2 = 0, and l2 → ∞ with l1 = 0, we obtain max {L(ϕ)(x, y), a1 − ϕx(x, y), a2 − ϕy(x, y)} ≤ 0.
Proposition 7 V is a viscosity subsolution of the HJB equation (8).
Proof. Arguing by contradiction, we assume that V is not a subsolution of (8) at (x0, y0) with x0 > 0 and y0 > 0. With a similar proof to the one of Proposition 3.1 of Azcue and Muler (2014), but extending the definitions to two variables, we first show that there exist ε > 0, h ∈ (0, min{x0/2, y0/2}) and a continuously differentiable function ψ : R 2 + → R such that ψ is a test function for the subsolution of Equation (8) at (x0, y0) and satisfies (11) ψx(x, y) ≥ a1, ψy(x, y) ≥ a2
, and let us take any admissible strategy L ∈ Πx 0 ,y 0 . Consider the corresponding controlled risk process (Xt, Yt) starting at (x0, y0), and define the stopping times
Note that τ * is finite for h small enough and that it is necessary to introduce θ because before a lump sum dividend payment, (Xτ , Yτ ) can be in [x0 − h, x0
and so, from (13), we obtain V (Xτ * , Yτ * ) ≤ ψ(Xτ * , Yτ * ) − 2ε, (2) If τ * = τ +θ, the distance from (Xτ * , Yτ * ) to (x0, y0) is at least h/2 ≥ h−max {p1, p2} θ, so from (13), we get (15) .
Since L i t , with i = 1, 2, is non-decreasing and left continuous, it can be written as
where
s is a continuous and non-decreasing function. Since the function ψ is continuously differentiable in R 2 + , using the expression (16) and the change of variables formula for finite variation processes, we can write ψ(Xτ * , Yτ * )e −δτ * − ψ(x0, y0)
Note that (Xs, Ys) ∈ R 2 + for s ≤ τ * except in the case that τ * = τ , where Xτ * + Yτ * < 0. Here we are extending the definition of ψ as
for x + y < 0. We have that X s + = Xs only at the jumps of L 1 s , and in this case
On the other hand, Xs = X s − only at the arrival of a claim for Company One, so
is a martingale with zero expectation for t ≤ τ . Analogously,
is also a martingale with zero expectation for t ≤ τ . So we get
Using the second inequality of (12), (14) and the definition of θ we get From (23), Lemma 4, (15) , (21) and (22), it follows that
−δτ * Iτ * <τ + ψ(x0, y0)
and this contradicts the assumption that V (x0, y0) = ψ(x0, y0).
From the above two propositions we get the following result.
Corollary 8 V is a viscosity solution of of the HJB equation (8).
Smallest Viscosity Solution
Let us prove now that the optimal value function V is the smallest viscosity supersolution of (8) .
We say that the function u : R 2 + → R satisfies the growth condition A.1, if
u(x, y) ≤ K + a1x + a2y for all (x, y) ∈ R 2 + . The following Lemma is technical and will be used to prove Proposition 10.
Lemma 9 Fix x0 > 0 and y0 > 0 and let u be a non-negative supersolution of (8) 
Proof. The proof follows by standard convolution arguments and is the extension to two variables of Lemma 4.1 in Azcue an Muler [9] .
Proposition 10
The optimal value function V is the smallest viscosity supersolution of (8) satisfying growth condition A.1.
Proof. Let u be a non-negative supersolution of (8) satisfying the growth condition A.1 and let L ∈ Πx,y; define (Xt, Yt) as the corresponding controlled risk process starting at (x, y). Consider the function um of Lemma 9 in R 2 + ; we extend this function as um(x, y) = a1V 0 1 (x)I x≥0 + a2V 0 2 (y)I y≥0 for x + y < 0.
As in the proof of Proposition 7, we get 
Using that both L 
From Lemma 9(c), we have
But using Lemma 9(b) and the inequality Xs ≤ x + p1s, Ys ≤ y + p2s we get (26) um(Xs, Ys) ≤ K + a1Xs + a2Ys ≤ K + a1x + a2y + ps.
So, using the bounded convergence theorem, we obtain
From (24), (25) and (27), we get (28)
Next, we show that
From (26), there exists a K such that
Since the last expression goes to 0 as t goes to infinity, we have (29). Let us prove now that 
Note that for s ≤ T , X s − ≤ x0 := x + p1T , Y s − ≤ y0 := y + p2T . From Lemma 9(e) we can find m0 large enough such that for any m ≥ m0
and so we get (30). Then, from (28) and using (29) and (30), we obtain
Since V is a viscosity solution of (8), the result follows. From the previous proposition we can deduce the usual viscosity verification result.
Corollary 11
Consider a family of admissible strategies {L x,y ∈ Πx,y : (x, y) ∈ R 2 + }. If the function V L x,y (x, y) is a viscosity supersolution of (8) for all (x, y) ∈ R 2 + , then V L x,y (x, y) is the optimal value function (4).
Iterative Approach
In this section, we approximate the optimal value function V defined in (4) by an increasing sequence of value functions of strategies which pay dividends (and collaborate if it is necessary) up to the n-th claim (regardless from which company) and then follow the take-the-moneyand-run strategy. Given initial surplus levels (x, y), the take-the-money-and-run admissible strategy L 0 pays immediately the entire surplus x and y as dividends (that is X 0 + = Y 0 + = 0), and then pays the incoming premium as dividends until the first claim, where the company facing that claim gets ruined. Note that under this strategy the companies can not help each other.
Consider τn as the time of arrival of the n-th claim regardless from which company, that is the n-th point of the Poisson process Nt = N 
for n ≥ 1, we also define V 0 = V L 0 . We can write
In this expression, we only consider the admissible strategy L ∈ Πx,y for t ≤ τ1. The following DPP holds.
Lemma 12
For any initial surplus (x, y) in R 2 + and any stopping time τ , we can write V n (x, y) = sup L∈Πx,y (Ex,y(a1
Proposition 13
We have that
Proof. We prove the result by induction:
. By (34), we have V n (x, y) ≥ sup L∈Πx,y Ex,y(a1
The HJB equation for V n is given by
The following basic results about regularity and growth at infinity of V n , n ≥ 1 are similar to those of Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 14
The optimal value function V n satisfies growth condition A.1, it is increasing and locally Lipschitz in R 2 + with
for any h > 0 and for any (x, y) in R 2 + . In the next two propositions, we see that V n is a viscosity solution of the corresponding HJB equation.
Proposition 15 V
n is a viscosity supersolution of the HJB equation (36) for x > 0 and y > 0.
Proof. Similar to the one given in Proposition 6.
Proposition 16 V
n is a viscosity subsolution of the corresponding HJB equation (36).
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the one of Proposition 7, but using as martingales with zero expectation
instead of the martingales M t defined in (19) and (20) respectively. In the next proposition we state that V n is the smallest viscosity solution of the corresponding HJB equation.
Proposition 17
The optimal value function V n is the smallest viscosity supersolution of (36) satisfying growth condition A.1.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is similar to the one of Proposition 10, but using as martingales with zero expectation (38) and (39).
Remark 18
From the above proposition we deduce the usual viscosity verification result for the n−step: Consider a family of admissible strategies {L x,y ∈ Πx,y :
Finally, we have the convergence result to the optimal value function (4).
Proposition 19 V n ր V as n goes to infinity.
Proof. By Lemma 3 and Lemma 2, V is increasing and satisfies property A.1, so there exists a T > 0 such that
for t ≥ T . Let us define κ = V (x + p1T, y + p2T ) > 0 and take n0 > 0 such that
There exists an admissible strategy L ∈ Πx,y such that
We define the strategy (40), (41) and Lemma 3, we have
Then we obtain from (42)
for any n ≥ n0.
Stationary dividend strategies
As in the one-dimensional case (see for instance Azcue and Muler [9] ) our aim is to find a stationary dividend strategy whose value function is the optimal value function V . A dividend strategy is stationary when the decision on the dividend payment depends on the current surplus only, and not on the full history of the controlled process; note that a stationary dividend strategy generates a family of admissible strategies L x,y ∈ Πx,y for any (x, y) ∈ R 2 + . If we assume that the optimal value function V is differentiable, the form in which the optimal value function solves the HJB equation at any (x, y) ∈ R 2 + suggests how the dividends should be paid when the current surplus is (x, y). There are only seven possibilities: Remark 20 Let us consider the simplest case of identical and independent Cramér-Lundberg processes in (1); that is p1 = p2 = p; λ1 = λ2; and
i have the same distribution F . We also choose the dividends paid by both companies to be equally weighted, i.e. a1 = a2 = 1/2. Under these assumptions, the optimal value function will be symmetric, that is V (x, y) = V (y, x), and so the sets introduced above satisfy the following properties: the line y = x is an axis of symmetry of the sets C * , B * 0 and A * 0 ; the sets B * 1 and A * 1 are the reflection with respect to the line y = x of the sets B * 2 and A * 2 respectively.
Curve strategies
We introduce a family of stationary dividend strategies, called curve strategies, in which dividends are paid in the seven ways mentioned in the previous section, having a simple structure: here the boundary between the action and non-action region is given by a curve. These strategies can be seen as the natural analogues of the one-dimensional barrier strategies in this two-dimensional case.
It is reasonable to think that if the optimal strategy is a curve strategy it should satisfy the following properties: If (x0, y0) ∈ B * 1 ∪ A * 1 (that is only Company One pays dividends), then (x, y0) should be in B * 1 for all x > x0; analogously if (x0, y0) ∈ B * 2 ∪ A * 2 (that is only Company Two pays dividends), then (x0, y) should be in B * 2 for all y > y0. Finally, the set C * should be bounded because, as in the one-dimensional case, the surplus of each company under the optimal strategy should be bounded for t > 0.
Let us define the curve strategies satisfying the properties mentioned above. For these strategies, R 2 + is partitioned into seven sets C, A0, A1, A2, B0, B1 and B2 where A = A0 ∪ A1 ∪ A2 is a curve which intersects both coordinate axes.
• A0 = {(x, y)} with (x, y) ∈ R 2 + . If the current surplus is (x, y), both companies pay their incoming premium as dividends. Let us call u the x-intercept and v the y-intercept of the line with slope p2/p1 passing through (x, y); let us denote O 
where ξ1 : [u, M ξ 1 ] → R is a continuously differentiable function with ξ1(u) = y, ξ1(M ξ 1 ) = 0 and negative derivative. If the current surplus (x, y) ∈ A1, Company Two does not pay dividends and Company One pays dividends at some special rate for which the bivariate surplus remains in the curve A1. By basic calculus, it can be shown that this rate is given by
• The set B1 is the set to the right of A1 in O
If the current surplus (x, y) ∈ B1, Company Two does not pay dividends and Company One pays the lump sum
• The sets A2 and B2 in O (x,y) 2 are defined analogously to A1 and B1 with the roles of Company One and Two interchanged; that is
and B2 = (x, y) ∈ R 2 + : x ≤ x and y > ξ −1
where ξ2 : [v, M ξ 2 ] → R is a continuously differentiable function with ξ2(v) = x, ξ2(M ξ 2 ) = 0 and negative derivative. If the current surplus (x, y) ∈ A2, Company One does not pay dividends and Company Two pays dividends at some special rate for which the bivariate surplus remains in the curve A2. Here this rate is
.
• If the current surplus (x, y) ∈ B2, Company One does not pay dividends and Company Two pays the lump sum
• The no-action region C is the open set delimited by the curve A and the axes. If the current surplus (x, y) ∈ C, no dividends are paid.
The set partition of the curve strategy corresponding to (x, y) = (1, 2) and the functions
is illustrated in Figure 7 .1. For any w ∈ R, let us define the set
Note that the curve strategies depend only on the point (x, y) ∈ R 2 + and the functions ξ1 ∈ Φ u and ξ2 ∈ Φ v , used in the parametrization of the curve A. We associate to any ξ = ((x, y) , ξ1, ξ2) and any (x,
t ) ∈ Πx,y Let us define the value function V ξ of this curve strategy as
We will look for ξ * such that the associated value function V ξ * is the optimal value function defined in (4).
Remark 21
In the case that A is the segment x + y = K for some K > 0 in R 2 + , the sum of the dividend rates paid by Company One and Two is p1 + p2 for any current surplus in this line. The point A0 = (x, K − x) indicates how this dividend payment is splitted among the two companies in A: At A0, Company One pays p1 and Company Two pays p2, to the right of this point (A1) Company One pays the total rate p1 + p2 and to the left of this point (A2) it is Company Two which pays p1 + p2.
Search for the Optimal Curve Strategy
In order to find the optimal value function V of the problem (4), we use the iterative approach introduced in Section 5 and Proposition 19. Our ultimate goal is to see whether the optimal value function V is the value function of a curve strategy as defined in the previous section.
We first define an auxiliary function. For any ξ = ((x, y), ξ1, ξ2), where (x, y) ∈ R 2 + , ξ1 ∈ Φ u , ξ2 ∈ Φ v and any continuous function W0 :
W ξ (x, y) := Ex,y(
If W0 is the value function of a family of admissible strategies L = Lx.y ∈ Πx,y (x,y)∈R 2 + , and C, A0, A1, A2, B0, B1 and B2 are the sets associated to ξ (as defined in the previous section), then W ξ would be the value function of the strategy which pays dividends according to the curve strategy L ξ up to the first claim and according to L afterwards. We call this kind of strategy a one-step curve strategy. Define (46) H(x, y) := I(W0)(x, y) + U (x, y).
In the next proposition, we find an explicit formula for the function W ξ in terms of W0 and ξ1 for (x, y) ∈ O (x,y) 1
; the formula for the value function for (x, y) ∈ O (x,y) 2 follows in an analogous way and depends only on ξ2.
In order to obtain this formula, we use the fact that W ξ satisfies the integro-differential equation L n (W ξ ) = 0 in C ∪ A and that W ξ x = a1 in A1 ∪ A0 ∪ B1 ∪ B. Proposition 22 Given ξ = ((x, y), ξ1, ξ2) and a continuous function W0, we have that
We can write
)), and so
Then g(t) = W ξ (x + p1t, y + p2t) is continuous and differentiable as long as (x + p1t, y + p2t) ∈ C with
Let us prove now that the function W ξ is continuous in A1 and has a continuous derivative in the direction of this curve. In case (x, y) ∈ A1, we have that for t < τ1 ∧ h and h > 0 small enough, the controlled surplus process is
By (45), we have that
Then, with an argument similar to the case of C, we obtain for any (x, y) ∈ A1,
is continuous and differentiable at t = 0 and satisfies
Since (x + p1t + t 0 p2/ξ ′ 1 (Xs − (p1/p2) Ys)ds, y + p2t) ∈ A1 for t small enough, we have that
Since u ′ 0 (t) = p2/ξ ′ 1 (Xt −(p1/p2) Yt) is continuous and negative, u −1 0 exists and is continuously differentiable, so
The equation L(W )(u, s) = 0 is a linear ODE in the variable s, so . We also have, from (47) and (48), that for any (x, y) ∈ A1,
, we conclude that W ξ x − (x, y) = a1. By (49), and since (u + (p1/p2) ξ1(u), ξ1(u)) ∈ A1,
and then
After some easy calculations and using that W ξ satisfies
it can be seen that W ξ is continuously differentiable in S with
Finally, the differentiability at the boundary of B0 follows from the differentiability of W ξ at (x, y) of S.
Let us define the set of functions
Proposition 25 The value function V ξ of the curve strategy corresponding to ξ = ((x, y), ξ1, ξ2) as defined in (44), satisfies the formulas given in Proposition 22 and Remark 23 replacing both W0 and W ξ by V ξ . Moreover, V ξ is the unique function in M which satisfies this property.
Proof. M is a complete metric space with the distance d(w1, w2) = sup R 2 + |w1 − w2| . The operator T : M → M defined as T (w)(x, y) := Ex,y(
is a contraction with contraction factor λ/(δ + λ) < 1. Then, there exists a unique fixed point and by definition (44) , T (V ξ ) = V ξ . Taking in Proposition 22 and in Remark 23 the function W0 as V ξ we obtain from (45) that V ξ = W ξ and so we get the result.
This last proposition gives a constructive way to obtain V ξ . Starting with w0(x, y) = a1x + a2y ∈ M, we define iteratively wn+1 = T (wn). Hence, V ξ = limn→∞ wn. Note that at each step wn+1 can be obtained from the formulas given in Proposition 22 and Remark 23 replacing W0 by wn.
Consider now the function V n,ξ defined in (45) taking W0 as the optimal value function V n−1 corresponding to step n − 1 in (33). We try to find ξ * n , which maximizes V n,ξ among all the possible ξ = ((x, y), ξ1, ξ2). If the function V n,ξ * n is a viscosity supersolution of (36), then by Remark 18, we would have that V n,ξ * n = V n . In the case that one-step curve strategies corresponding to ξ * n exist for all n ≥ 1, by Proposition 19, V n,ξ * n ր V . Let us call, as in (46), (51) Hn−1(x, y) := I(V n−1 )(x, y) + U (x, y) .
In order to find the optimal one-step curve strategy corresponding to ξ * n = ((x * n , y * n ), ξ * 1,n , ξ * 2,n ), we look first for the optimal vertex (x * n , y * n ). By the formula given in Proposition 22,
for x and y large enough. So
If this maximum is attained at a critical point (assuming that Hn−1 is differentiable), we have that (x * n , y * n ) is a solution of ∂xHn−1(x, y) = a1 (δ + λ) ∂yHn−1(x, y) = a2 (δ + λ) .
Let us call u * n = x * n − (p1/p2) y * n and v * n = y * n − (p2/p1) x * n . Next, we use Calculus of Variations in order to find two curves ξ * 1,n and ξ * 2,n which maximize V n,ξ (x, y), among all ξ = ((x * n , y * n ), ξ1, ξ2) for ξ1 ∈ Φ u * n , ξ2 ∈ Φ Proof. We will prove this result for ξ * 1,n , the proof for ξ * 2,n is analogous. Given any ξ1 ∈ Φ u * n , we have that 
Numerical Example
We present a numerical example in the symmetric and equally weighted case with an exponential claim size distribution. By Remark 20, we restrict the search of the optimal curve strategy to ξ = ((x, x) , ξ, ξ), ξ ∈ Φ 0 . Using the formulas given in Propositions 22 and 26, we obtain the functions ξ * n ∈ Φ 0 and we check numerically that for ξ * n = ((x * n , x * n ) , ξ * n , ξ * n ) the associated value function V n,ξ * n is a viscosity solution of (36). We also obtain numerically the convergence of ξ * n to ξ according to Definition 27. Then, using Proposition 28, one can conclude that the optimal strategy is a curve strategy with curve ξ * . The numerical procedure was done with the Mathematica software and the calculation is quite time-consuming. The concrete chosen parameters are: exponential claim size distribution with parameter 3, Poisson intensity λ1 = λ2 = 20/9, premium rate p1 = p2 = 1, and a discount factor δ = 0.1. In this numerical procedure we used step-size ∆x = ∆y = 0.002 and iterated 60 times. The resulting optimal curve strategy is given in Figure 9 .1, and V (x, y) − (x + y)/2 (the improvement of the optimal dividend strategy over paying out the initial capital immediately) is depicted as the upper curve in Figure 9 .2.
We also compare for this numerical example the optimal value function V (x, y) with the (comparably weighted) sum of the stand-alone value functions without collaboration:
and with VM (x + y)/2, where VM is the optimal value function for the merger of the two companies. Figure 9 .2 depicts the graphics of all three value functions V (x, y), VS(x, y) and VM (x + y)/2, each of them reduced by (x + y)/2. The optimal merger strategy is barrier with barrier b = 2.77. By Remark 1, VM (x + y)/2 < V (x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ R 2 + . One sees that whereas for the comparison between the stand-alone case and the merger the initial surplus levels matter (with the merger case being the lowest of the three value functions in (0, 0)), the collaboration case outperforms not only the merger case but also the stand-alone one for all combinations of initial surplus levels (i.e. if one measures the overall dividend payments that can be achieved with either behavior, for this numerical example collaboration is always preferable). Hence we have here an instance where collaboration is beneficial not only for safety aspects, but also with respect to collective profitability. 
